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more important, it is amenable to practical 
literary criticism. It continues to exert an ever-
growing influence on the development of reader-
response criticism.
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Islamic philosophy A philosophical tradition
whose historical, linguistic, and religious par-
ameters are still a matter of some dispute. The 
tradition is referred to variously as “Arabic,”
“Islamic,” or “Muslim” philosophy. These names
are sometimes used interchangeably, although
they have different implications. The concept of
an “Arabic philosophy” can be traced back to the
medieval Christian Latins, who used the term to
describe the enormous body of philosophical
work that they appropriated from Islamic lands.
It is first and foremost a linguistic, rather than 
ethnic or geographical, category. Nineteenth-
and twentieth-century orientalists inherited the
rubric, and even today a significant number of
scholars – mostly Western, but not exclusively –
continue to employ it. Yet over the past fifty years
or so, it has encountered increasing suspicion.
There are numerous reasons for this, some 
of which simply have to do with contingent facts
about the term’s effective history. One is that 
the traditional framework of Arabic philosophy
tended arbitrarily to privilege the classical period,
specifically those thinkers who were most influ-
enced by Greek philosophy. The standard story
was that Arabic philosophy emerged in the ninth
century out of the great Greco-Arabic translation
project, was inspired by Greek philosophy (which
provided it with its central concepts and tech-
niques), and was shaped to a large extent by 
the increasingly evident tensions between reason
and faith. Much ink was spilled, for example,
over questions concerning the createdness or
eternality of the world, the nature of God, the 
existence of divine attributes over and above
God’s essence, God’s causal relation to the world,
whether God knows temporal particulars (and thus
is aware of what we do, rewarding and punish-
ing us in an appropriate way), the nature of the
human soul or intellect and its afterlife, the good
life for human beings, and whether the tools of
logic can help us achieve certainty independently
of divine revelation.
According to traditional accounts of Arabic
philosophy, its founding figure was al-Kindc,
who played a pivotal role in the translation
movement, legitimized the appropriation of 
foreign wisdom, and was the first to weld Greek
philosophical doctrines onto the worldview of
Islam. Its two most representative figures were 
the Peripatetic (mashshA’C) philosophers al-Farabc
(L: Alfarabius) and Ibn Scna (L: Avicenna), who
internalized Greek logic and constructed the
ambitious metaphysical systems that synthesized
Aristotelian, Neoplatonic, and Islamic ideas. Its
bête noir was the Ash‘arite theologian and tefc
mystic al-Ghazalc, who critiqued the philosophers
according to their own methods of proof and 
ultimately accused them of unbelief. Its final
flowering was the great Andalusian polymath
Ibn Rushd (L: Averroës), who provided a power-
ful response to al-Ghazalc’s criticisms and went
on to retrieve the true sense of Aristotle’s
thought through his extensive commentarial
project. However, by that time the tide had
effectively turned against philosophy in the
Islamic world, according to the traditional
Western account. After the death of Ibn Rushd
at the end of the twelfth century, it was quickly
eclipsed by theology and mysticism. Anomalies 
like Ibn Khalden aside, philosophical thought
had run its course in the Islamic world. Luckily,
the achievements of Arabic philosophers had
begun to be recognized by Christian scholars,
and another ambitious translation project – this
time from Arabic to Latin – was initiated. The
Scholastic tradition profited enormously from
the translations, commentaries, and careful sys-
tematic interpretations they inherited. In short,
Arabic philosophers preserved Greek learning
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the West and ultimately made it possible for
Christian Europe to reconnect with, and gather
vitality from, its classical roots. Indeed, the chief
value of Arabic philosophy lay in its preservative
and transmissive role: apart from that it con-
tributed little of new value to the Greek heritage
(Boer, 1901/67; Walzer, 1962).
This story is not entirely wrong: Greek thought
did indeed have a considerable early impact on
Arabic philosophy, there were significant con-
ceptual tensions between Greek philosophical
doctrines and Islamic revelation, and Christian
scholars certainly put the achievements of Arabic
philosophers to good use. However, it is misleading
for several reasons. I shall set aside the more
heavy-handed Orientalist assumptions scattered
throughout this story and focus only on points
of direct and obvious philosophical relevance
(for discussions of the former, see Said, 1979;
Mahdi, 1990).
First, in focusing predominately on Greek
influences, accounts of this sort cannot help but
underestimate the original and unique indigenous
contributions of philosophers in the Islamic
milieu, as well as the Qur’anic, pre-Islamic Arab,
Persian, and Indian sources they also drew upon.
Al-Kindc’s prophetic dictum that we should take
the truth wherever we find it applies not just to
the Greeks, but to any nation or people from which
Muslims might gain knowledge. Further, by 
valorizing the achievements of Arabic philosophy
primarily in terms of their instrumental utility for
European beneficiaries, we overlook the intrinsic
value of the tradition as understood on its own
terms. Indeed, it forces us to view the tradition
in a very selective and distorted way, since what
may have been important to the Latins was not
always as important to their Arabic brethren,
and vice versa. A case in point here would be 
Ibn Rushd. In Western histories, he is cast as 
the final, enormously important figure in the
Arabic philosophical lineage. And he was import-
ant – first to the Scholastics, then to European
Enlightenment thinkers, and later to Arab
modernists. In Islamic accounts, however, he is
generally a peripheral figure with no real students
– just one relatively minor moment in a tradition
that continues beyond the twelfth century up 
to the present day. His reply to al-Ghazalc’s 
critique of Ibn Scna had very little impact within
the Islamic context, as compared, for example, to
al-uesc’s replies to al-Sharastanc’s and Fakhr 
al-Dcn al-Razc’s critique of Ibn Scna, which were
enormously influential. Traditional Western
accounts of Arabic philosophy can thus diverge
radically at crucial junctures from the effective his-
tory of philosophy within the Islamic tradition.
A second problem with this model is that it
overstates the conflict between philosophy and 
religion. This not difficult to do, especially if one
views it through a Christian lens. Yet historically,
philosophy within the Islamic tradition has been
neither as central nor as doctrinally constrained
as its Christian counterpart. Although it has 
had its historical moments of impressive polit-
ical patronage (eighth- through tenth-century
Baghdad under the ‘Abbasid caliphate, twelfth-
century Andalusia under Almoravid and Almohad
rule, sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Ixfahan
under tafavid rule, etc.), it has generally occupied
a more peripheral and less important position than
such traditional Islamic sciences as jurisprudence
( fiqh), Qur’anic exegesis (tafsCr), prophetic tradi-
tions (WadCth) or even speculative theology (“ilm
al-kalAm). At the same time, philosophy main-
tained a much greater degree of autonomy from
religious authority, in part perhaps because of its
own critical temperament, but also because of its
relatively marginal status and the decentralized
structure of Islam itself. Individual scholars of the
traditional sciences (“ulamA’) may have critiqued
particular aspects of philosophy (al-Ghazalc, 
Ibn Taymiyya) and even issued fatwas declaring
the impermissibility of philosophy and logic in 
general (Ibn al-talaw), but there is no Islamic
equivalent to, for example, the Catholic Church’s
Condemnation of 1277.
One can certainly find an indigenous distinc-
tion within the Islamic world between intellect
( “aql ) and tradition (naql ) as two different ways
to arrive at or justify a belief. However, this 
distinction does not map on easily to the usual
Western opposition between reason and author-
ity based on revelation or tradition. For instance,
Islamic “traditionalists” have historically accused
“rationalists” of blind obedience (taqlCd). They
thought that Greek-influenced philosophers
were often aping their foreign predecessors with-
out really demonstrating their conclusions. This
charge will seem perplexing to contemporary
Western philosophers, who may assume that 
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acceptance of historical or religious authority.
Yet figures perceived as clear-cut traditionalists 
or rationalists in the West are often considerably
more ambiguous figures within the Islamic con-
text itself. Take, for instance, two of the greatest
Andalusian thinkers, Ibn sazm and the afore-
mentioned Ibn Rushd. Ibn sazm has often been
portrayed in Western accounts as a kind of arch-
traditionalist, in part because of his affiliation
with the vahirite theological-juridical school,
which was notoriously literalist and insisted on
privileging the apparent or external (ZAhir) sense
of religious texts. Yet his views on logic and 
various theological disputes are actually quite
subtle and moderate and he is in fact viewed by
many contemporary Arab intellectuals as part of
the rationalist legacy of Islam. Ibn Rushd, on the
other hand, is often cast in Western histories as
the consummate rationalist and even a harbinger
of secular modernity. Yet he belonged to the
Malckite school of jurisprudence (one of the most
conservative of the four Sunnc religious legal
movements) and was appointed as the Grand
Judge of Cordoba – a position that could only be
attained by someone with an unrivaled knowledge
of and commitment to Islamic law (sharC “a). The
reality is that Ibn Rushd, like most philosophers
in the Islamic world, saw the claims of reason 
and revelation as dovetailing harmoniously
(contrary to later misinterpretations of the Latin
Averroists). Accordingly, the distinction between
philosophical proof, theological disputation, 
and prophetic revelation was oftentimes cast in
terms of the intended audience and appropriate
method of communication (apodictic demon-
stration, dialectic, and rhetoric) rather than the
actual content or significance of the message
itself.
A more specific version of the philosophy–
religion conflict thesis was articulated by the
Straussian school, which emphasized the primacy
of philosophers’ political aims and the necessity
of the “art of writing” (Strauss, 1952/88; Butter-
worth, 1992; Mahdi, 2001). This is an influential
approach that has nonetheless generated a good
deal of criticism (Leaman, 1985/2001; Gutas,
2002). Setting aside the debate over whether
Arabic philosophers employed esoteric strategies
of writing to protect themselves (and if so, who
is qualified to decide what they actually meant),
the question is whether they really needed 
so desperately to conceal their doctrines from
religio-political authorities. Traditionalist scholars
may have been skeptical of the philosophers’
assurances and irked by their apparent elitism 
– indeed, they condemned their methods and
conclusions more than once – but there is little
historical evidence that philosophers were ever
actually persecuted, let alone executed, for their
opinions.
A third problem with the received Western
account of Arabic philosophy is that it makes 
the philosophical tradition of the Islamic world
appear much more homogeneous and monolithic
than it really is. Almost without exception, the 
central philosophers in this account belonged 
to the aforementioned Peripatetic school, which
was most indebted to the Greeks. But even
within the classical period, there was a plurality
of diverse intellectual movements and schools: 
the Mu‘tazilite and Ash‘arite theologians, the
Isma‘clcs, the tefcs, and the school of Illumina-
tion (ishrAq). In addition to these, there were
various uncategorizable freethinkers, as well 
as traditionalist jurists and theologians who
mounted sophisticated attacks on the philosophers.
At the end of this period (the close of the twelfth
century) philosophy was for the most part sub-
sumed by theology and mysticism in the Sunnc
world (at least for several centuries), but that did
not signal its death in the Islamic world overall.
Philosophy continued to flourish in Shi‘ite-
dominated areas (most notably, Persia), as well
as in India and Turkey. Independent figures and
new syncretic but systematic schools of philo-
sophy emerged well into the modern period, 
culminating in the ambitious metaphysical 
synthesis of the school of Ixfahan. The Rebirth 
or Renaissance (naWda) of the nineteenth century
then signaled a reawakening of philosophy in the
Sunnc Arab world in response to its engagement
with the West. A wide variety of philosophical
schools, movements, and projects have sub-
sequently proliferated in the twentieth century,
some as an after-effect of the naWda, some rooted
in centuries-old traditions of thought (for a 
useful overview by region, see the final section 
of Nasr and Leaman, 1996).
Of course, few contemporary advocates of the
“Arabic philosophy” model would now main-
tain that it begins and ends with the classical
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clash between reason and revelation, or that it is
merely an unimaginative reiteration of classical
Greek insights valuable only for its preservative
function (see, for example, Gutas, 2002; Adamson
and Taylor, 2005; McGinnis and Reisman, 2007;
for thoughtful defenses of this rubric). There are,
however, lingering problems with the idea of
Arabic philosophy. The first is that despite the 
ad hoc way in which the category has been
expanded to embrace post-classical developments,
it remains too narrow to do justice to the diverse
tradition sketched out above. Some critics of the
term have pointed out that very few philo-
sophers before the modern period were actually
Arab (most were Persian, some Turkish, Indian,
etc.). This, however, misses the point, since as 
mentioned before the “Arabic” classification has
always been first and foremost linguistic. And 
there is little question that Arabic was the lingua
franca of philosophical discussion during the
classical period. Yet even then, key works were
written in Persian as well (e.g. by Ibn Scna), 
and in the post-classical period the majority of
philosophical texts were in fact composed in 
languages other than Arabic (again, most notably
Persian, but also Turkish, Urdu, French, and
English, among others).
The second point is more substantive. Advo-
cates of the “Arabic” rubric generally see the
Greco-Arabic translation movement as the for-
mative moment in the tradition, and thus place
a great premium on the Greek origins of Arabic
philosophy. This is understandable, since the
Greeks are generally taken (at least in the West)
to be the progenitors of philosophy. Indeed,
Epicurus bragged that “only Greeks philosophize.”
But can there be non-Greek forms of philosophy?
Specifically, can there be forms of philosophical
endeavor in the Islamic world that do not derive
from, or even independently approximate, the
practice of philosophy produced by the Greeks?
To ask this question is to ask what philosophy is,
or what it ought to be, and who gets to decide
that. One might maintain that only theoretical
reflection and ethical cultivation pursued in the
classical Greek mode constitutes genuine philo-
sophy. But in that case, many other rich intel-
lectual traditions would be entirely eliminated 
or at least disfigured beyond recognition. For
instance, there is no indigenous word analogous
to philosophy in either classical Sanskrit or
Chinese, and neither the traditional Indian
darManas nor the Chinese masters would fit the
Procrustean bed of the Greeks very comfortably.
Indeed, the vast majority of what is considered
philosophy in the European tradition would
probably be excluded according to this criterion.
The Arabic philosophical tradition occupies 
a unique place with regard to this question,
because since the beginning of the classical period
there have been two distinct and etymologically
unrelated words for philosophy. One is a loan 
word from the Greek: falsafa (an Arabization 
of philosophia, lit. “love of wisdom”). This term
was most often used to describe the thinking and
way of life of the Greek-influenced philosophers
( falAsifa) during the classical period. The second
term is an indigenous one that appears in the
Qur’an numerous times: Wikma or “wisdom.”
This is used side by side with falsafa during the
classical period and with even greater frequency
after that.
From a classical Greek philosophical perspec-
tive, the claim that one is already in possession
of wisdom rather than merely desiring and 
pursuing it might seem indefensibly hubristic (as
sophists or “wise men” often appear in Platonic
dialogues). Yet the WakCm is not a sophistBs.
Philosophers in the Islamic tradition have gener-
ally believed that the point of pursuing wisdom
is precisely to attain it and enact it, in order to
transform and perfect the self (the soteriological
function of knowledge is a common theme among
most schools). Further, Wikma casts a much
wider epistemic net than falsafa. It encompasses
not just the rational argumentation, conceptual
analysis and demonstrative proofs of the Greek-
influenced philosophers, but other ostensive
sources of knowledge: divine revelation and its 
exegesis, prophecy, traditions, dialectical specu-
lative theology, authoritative esoteric teachings,
intuitive insights, mystical experience, spiritual
exercises, and ethical self-cultivation.
Whether or not such things ought legitimately
to be considered philosophy is a contentious
question (see Nasr, 2006, and Gutas, 2002, for
opposing perspectives). It is worth bearing in
mind that one could just as easily pose that ques-
tion about contemporary philosophical activity 
in Europe or the Americas, none of which pre-
serves the whole character of Greek philosophia
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it would seem that Arabic philosophy honors
this conception much more genuinely despite
modern Western conceits about our Greco-
Roman lineage. The crucial point, though, is
that this is how philosophy came to be con-
ceived within the Islamic milieu. And if it is to
be understood properly, it must be understood
first on its own terms and not simply crammed
into the heteronomous categories of Greek 
philosophy or contemporary Western academic
practices. The attempt to legislate what is and is
not genuine philosophy based on our current
assumptions, methods, and concerns – or to
acknowledge other traditions only to the extent
that they approximate those privileged charac-
teristics – is provincial and dogmatic at best.
More often than not, it is merely a thinly veiled
form of cultural imperialism.
For any number of these reasons, many 
scholars have abandoned the category of “Arabic
philosophy” altogether and instead speak of
“Islamic” philosophy (Corbin, 1964; Fakhry,
1970; Leaman and Nasr, 1996). This rubric
seems to cast the net more widely, and it certainly
captures some of the movements and historical
developments that “Arabic philosophy” has 
typically excluded (e.g. the Isma‘clcs, philosoph-
ically informed Ash‘arite theology, traditionalist
critics, the ishrAqC school, philosophical tefism,
various later Shi‘ite syntheses). Advocates of this
taxonomy emphasize that Islamic philosophy is
not simply a short-lived medieval phenomenon,
but a flourishing vital tradition that continues to
this day. One further advantage of this approach
is that it attempts to do justice to the profound
and unique influence that Islam has exercised
upon philosophy. Yet in doing so, it oftentimes
exaggerates the religious dimension.
Henri Corbin characterized Islamic philosophy
as la philosophie prophétique: “a philosophy
whose development, and whose modalities are
essentially linked to the religious and spiritual 
fact of Islam” (Corbin, 1964, pp. xiv–xv). In a 
similar vein, Seyyed Hossein Nasr defends the 
idea that Islamic philosophy is derived directly
from Islamic revelation, describing it as “essen-
tially a philosophical hermeneutics of the Sacred
Text” (Nasr, 1996, p. 37). But this is simply the
inverted mirror image of the modern Western
assumption that philosophy and religion are by
their very nature distinct and antagonistic towards
one another. That essential antagonism has now
been replaced by an essential peace, attained
only by stripping philosophy of its intellectual
autonomy and subordinating it to revealed truths.
The question is then whether a philosophy that
is merely the handmaid of theology does not
cease to be philosophy altogether.
Further, while the category of Islamic philo-
sophy appears to be a more inclusive category than
that of Arabic philosophy, one may ask whether
it is in some respects too inclusive. Some critics
of this approach have complained that it ends 
up granting primacy to the mystical, esoteric,
and even exegetical elements of the tradition, at
the expense of logical analysis, rational disputation,
and independent critical inquiry (Gutas, 2002).
Indeed, philosophy is redefined so broadly here
that it becomes synonymous with any kind of intel-
lectual or spiritual activity. As mentioned earlier,
Islamic philosophy must be approached first on
its own terms and not simply crammed into
alien categories if it is to be properly appreciated.
But this is not to say that emic perspectives auto-
matically trump etic perspectives, or cannot be held
accountable to anything other than their own
unexamined assumptions. Such a claim would be
sheer dogmatism and deeply unphilosophical. It
is thus still legitimate – indeed, it is incumbent
on us when engaging in cross-cultural philosophy
– to ask again and again the question of what 
philosophy is and what it ought to be.
An additional problem with the “Islamic”
rubric is that not all thinkers in this tradition 
produced philosophical work that was actually
Islamic, in the sense of being “derived directly from
the Islamic revelation” (Nasr, 1996, p. 37, n.1).
While a great many philosophers in this milieu
have certainly perceived themselves as deeply
religious people, it was not uncommon for them
to be accused of illegitimate innovation (bid “a) 
or even unbelief (kufr) by more traditionalist
voices. To dismiss such criticisms as provin-
cial or unrepresentative would be grossly to
underestimate their sophistication, authority,
and influence. Many philosophers did arguably
introduce intellectual innovations that took 
considerable liberties with the apparent sense 
of scripture. Particularly during the classical
period, the aforementioned harmony between
philosophy and Islam was often achieved by bend-
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made revelation answerable to the claims of 
reason. Some even eschewed key Islamic tenets
such as the reality of prophecy, the immort-
ality of the soul, and the prospect of reward and
punishment in an afterlife. This is not to deny the
enormous significance and influence of Islam on
philosophy. Sometimes philosophical reflection 
has preserved and clarified and defended Islamic
doctrines and practices, sometimes it has appro-
priated and reinterpreted them, and sometimes
it has critiqued and rejected them. It should be
noted as well that sometimes it simply has had
nothing to do with them, as is the case with the
enormous body of work on logic. To insist that
all thought that emerged within the Islamic
world is somehow directly derived from (or even
always in accordance with) Qur’anic revelation,
and thus that it is essentially and steadfastly
Islamic, would be to ignore or radically misrep-
resent some of its most important and influential
voices. In short, the “Islamic” rubric makes the
tradition appear much more univocal than it
really is.
For these reasons, some scholars have preferred
to employ the more cautious rubric of “Muslim”
philosophy (Sharif, 1961/99). This would then
encompass all philosophy created by those who
called themselves Muslims, setting aside the
question of whether their philosophy was really
strictly speaking Islamic in the aforementioned
sense. This constitutes an improvement over the
religious essentialism of the “Islamic” rubric, 
but it remains too narrow, because a significant
number of thinkers who were not even nominally
Muslim played a considerable role in this tradi-
tion as teachers, translators, and philosophical
interlocutors. Some important Arabic-speaking
philosophers in the Islamic world were Jews,
some were Christians, some were pagan Sabians,
and some were zanAdiqa, i.e. Manichean dualists
or, more loosely, heretical freethinkers. A number
of this last group evinced a strong skepticism
and hostility toward revealed religions, not except-
ing Islam. In this respect at least, the “Arabic”
rubric is actually preferable to the “Islamic” and
“Muslim” taxonomies, since it recognizes a good
many figures that they would exclude.
Ultimately, the most appropriate rubric for
capturing the unique diversity of this intel-
lectual tradition might simply be Marshall G. S.
Hodgson’s awkward but useful term “Islamicate,”
which “refer[s] not directly to the religion, Islam,
itself, but to the social and cultural complex his-
torically associated with Islam and the Muslims,
both among Muslims themselves and even when
found among non-Muslims” (Hodgson, 1974,
vol. 1, p. 59). Applied to the study of philosophy,
it would encompass any thought that emerges
within a societal context predominately informed
by the religious, political, and cultural dimensions
of Islam, whether or not its presuppositions and
conclusions are necessarily Islamic. This casts
the net widely enough to capture the entirety of
the tradition, without pretending to subordinate
all the diverse forms of philosophical inquiry to
the revealed truths of Islam, or ignoring non-
Muslims who played an important role in the 
historical dialogue. It also remains truer to the 
protean spirit of philosophy, by signifying a 
provisional starting point, rather than making
monolithic claims about its doctrines, the beha-
vior of the people who produce it, or even the 
language through which it is expressed.
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Islamic studies Given the vast scope of
Islamic studies, in terms of subject matter, his-
tory, and geography, this brief account will limit
itself to indicating certain crucial developments
and suggesting the ways in which major modern
theories have begun to make incursions into
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